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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3753  
______________ 
 
REGIONAL EMPLOYERS ASSURANCE LEAGUES VOLUNTARY EMPLOYEES 
BENEFICIARY ASSOCIATION TRUST BY PENNMONT BENEFIT SERVICES, 
INC., PLAN ADMINISTRATOR 
 
v. 
 
GRETCHEN HUTTO CASTELLANO; DOMINIC M. CASTELLANO D.D.S. P.A. 
 
v. 
 
GRETCHEN HUTTO CASTELLANO, 
 
    Counter Claimant 
 
    v. 
 
REGIONAL EMPLOYERS ASSURANCE LEAGUES VOLUNTARY 
EMPLOYEES BENEFICIARY ASSOCIATION TRUST BY PENNMONT BENEFIT 
SERVICES, INC., PLAN ADMINISTRATOR; LAWRENCE KORESKO; JEANNE D. 
BONNEY; JOHN J. KORESKO, V; KORESKO FINANCIAL L.P.; KORESKO & 
ASSOCIATES, P.C.; PENN-MONT BENEFIT SERVICES, INC., 
 
         Counter Defendants 
 
Gretchen Hutto Castellano, 
 
        Appellant  
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-03-cv-06903) 
District Judge:  Honorable Wendy Beetlestone 
______________ 
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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 20, 2018 
 
Before:  MCKEE, VANASKIE,* and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed March 13, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION** 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 Appellant, Gretchen Hutto Castellano, appeals the District Court’s denial of her 
motion for prejudgment interest.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm.  
I.1     
 Appellant’s husband owned a dental practice which joined the Regional 
Employers Assurance League (“REAL”), an unincorporated association of employers 
who adopted a benefit structure for their employees under REAL’s Voluntary Employees 
Beneficiary Association (“VEBA”).  REAL’s assets were held by the REAL VEBA Trust 
(“the Trust”).  Appellant’s husband sent contributions to the Trust, part of which were 
used to purchase a $750,000 life insurance policy.     
                                              
*
 Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie retired from the Court on Jan. 1, 2019.  This Opinion is filed 
by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and I.O.P. 12.1. 
 
**
 This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1
 We write exclusively for the parties and therefore set forth only those facts that are 
necessary for our disposition. 
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 Upon the death of appellant’s husband, Mrs. Castellano submitted a REAL VEBA 
Death Benefit Form naming her as beneficiary, but the plan administrator denied her 
claim for benefits.  The plan administrator filed a civil action for declaratory judgment on 
behalf of the Trust, and appellant asserted counterclaims for an award of benefits against 
counterclaim defendants, including John J. Koresko, who ran REAL VEBA and the 
Trust, and several Koresko-affiliated entities.2  Upon cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court found in favor of defendants and denied the Trust’s request 
for declaratory judgment.  Further, the Court granted appellant’s motion for summary 
judgment on her counterclaim for violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), and ordered the Trust to pay appellant $750,000.     
The District Court subsequently awarded attorneys’ fees to appellant’s counsel but 
denied appellant’s request for prejudgment interest on the $750,000 awarded.  In 
particular, the requests for fees and interest were referred by the District Judge to U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey, who concluded that counterclaim defendants were 
liable for appellant’s attorneys’ fees in the amount of $567,400.26, but that an award for 
prejudgment interest on the aforementioned $750,000 should be denied.  
In support of her conclusion that interest should be denied, Judge Hey explained 
that this case was integrally related to Perez v. Koresko, a case brought by the 
Department of Labor (“DOL”) alleging violations of fiduciary duties under ERISA by 
                                              
2
 The counterclaim defendants abandoned this litigation prior to the District Court’s 
disposition, and thus they are not participating in the appeal.  However, at our invitation, 
Wilmington Trust, N.A., the court-appointed trustee for the Trust in the related case, 
Perez v. Koresko, 86 F. Supp.3d 293 (E.D. Pa. 2015), filed a brief as amicus curiae for 
purposes of this appeal.   
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counterclaim defendants in this case (Koresko and Koresko-affiliated entities 
(collectively “Koresko entities”)).  The District Court in Perez ruled in favor of the DOL 
and concluded, among other things, that assets belonging to the Trust had been 
misappropriated and depleted by Koresko entities, and as a result of the ERISA 
violations, Koresko entities were found liable for $38,337,540.89.3  Judge Hey pointed 
out that:  
[T]he economic reality is that other Trust beneficiaries will 
bear the cost of every dollar that is given to Mrs. Castellano 
in prejudgment interest.  Based on her position as the first of 
the victims . . . to file suit, Mrs. Castellano’s case was decided 
prior to the forthcoming equitable distribution of the Trusts’ 
assets.  Her claim was for $750,000 and she received that, 
albeit delayed.  The other Trust beneficiaries will not be in 
the same position.  [The Honorable Mary A.] McLaughlin has 
already determined that there is a shortfall of over $19 million 
due to the malfeasance of the Koresko Entities.  
  
Reg’l Emp’rs Assur. Leagues Vol. Emp’ees Beneficiary Ass’n Trust v. Castellano, 2016 
WL 540817, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2016) (footnote and citation omitted); see Perez, 86 F. 
Supp.3d at 394, 396.4  Accordingly, Judge Hey concluded prejudgment interest should be 
                                              
3
 The District Court in Perez appointed a forensic accountant to conduct an equitable 
accounting of the Trust’s assets and develop methodologies for the equitable distribution 
of the Trust’s assets (“Unified Model”), ultimately adopted by the District Court.  The 
remainder of the cases brought by plan participants were stayed pending the equitable 
distribution of the Trust’s assets.  
4
 As Wilmington Trust points out in its amicus brief, the Unified Model adopted by the 
Perez Court describes two methods for paying death benefit claims.  If the death occurred 
before July 9, 2013 (when a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was entered in Perez), 
payment to a beneficiary is 100% of the determined death benefit.  If a death occurred on 
or after the TRO was entered, then the death benefit is to be subject to a pro-rata 
reduction for the asset shortfall discount (“ASD”).  In either event, the payment from the 
Trust does not include interest.   
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denied because “the equities weigh heavily against” awarding interest, in light of the 
unusual circumstances of this case.  Castellano, 2016 WL 540817, at *4.   
Objections to Judge Hey’s conclusions were filed, and the Honorable Wendy 
Beetlestone stayed the matter until the completion of the equitable accounting which had 
been ordered in Perez.  After the case was returned to active status, Judge Beetlestone 
overruled all objections, approved and adopted Judge Hey’s conclusions, awarded 
attorneys’ fees, and denied prejudgment interest.  Appellant now appeals the denial of 
prejudgment interest.5             
II.6 
Appellant requests prejudgment interest with respect to benefits she was awarded 
pursuant to a judgment under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  In 
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2004), our Court “ma[d]e 
explicit that . . . an ERISA plaintiff who prevails under § 502(a)(1)(B) in seeking an 
award of benefits may request prejudgment interest under that section as part of his or her 
benefits award.”  Id. at 207-08.  “[I]n the absence of an explicit statutory command 
otherwise, district courts have broad discretion to award prejudgment interest on a 
                                              
5
 In offering its understanding of the Perez Court’s consideration and treatment of interest 
issues, Wilmington Trust points out that an award of prejudgment interest in this case 
would be inconsistent with the District Court’s rulings in Perez under the Unified Model 
ultimately adopted in Perez.  Wilmington Trust further points out that appellant’s 
$750,000 award in this case (100% of the face value of the insurance policy), without 
interest, is consistent with the Unified Model adopted by the Court in Perez.   
 
6 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291.   
 
 6 
 
judgment obtained pursuant to a federal statute.”  Id. at 205-06 (citing Anthuis v. Colt 
Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1009 (3d Cir. 1992)) (emph. added) (applying this 
“long-standing rule” in the ERISA context).   
 Although prejudgment interest is ordinarily granted as a general rule, interest may 
be denied where “exceptional or unusual circumstances exist making the award of 
interest inequitable.”  Id. at 208 (quoting Anthuis, 971 F.2d at 1010).  In Skretvedt, we 
emphasized that “the awarding of prejudgment interest under federal law is committed to 
the trial court’s broad discretion.”  Id. (quoting Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 
726 F.2d 972, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1984)).  Here, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying prejudgment interest in light of the equity considerations and the 
unusual circumstances of this case.     
The District Court’s Order approving and adopting Judge Hey’s well-reasoned 
conclusion that prejudgment interest should be denied in this case is affirmed.     
